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1Abstract
The valuation of traceable or safety-branded food by consumers in developing countries
a￿ected by diseases such as avian in￿uenza, or with food safety issues in general, is very di￿cult
to identify. Products that have safety-branding are not common, and food is usually purchased
by bargaining at informal markets. However, valuation of traceability has important implications
for livestock disease policies as well as agricultural sector development. Through developing a
short-term certi￿ed supply chain for free range chicken in Hanoi, we were able to conduct a
combined ￿eld experiment and detailed household survey to measure the valuation of this type
of poultry. We ￿nd that consumers in urban Hanoi on average have a welfare gain of about $1
per whole chicken purchase for safety-branding and traceability, which translates into a potential
annual consumer welfare gain of $66 million for such characteristics.
Keywords: ￿eld experiments, avian in￿uenza, Vietnam, food safety
JEL classi￿cation: C93, D12, Q13, Q18
The food preferences of urban consumers in rapidly growing countries like Viet Nam will have a large
impact of the development of the agricultural sector in these countries (Pingali, 2007). How demand
for food evolves will have important implications for policies related to food safety, agricultural
development and rural poverty. Demand for safe food is especially relevant in Viet Nam, where highly
pathogenic avian in￿uenza (HPAI) has become endemic after several large outbreaks from 2003-5
(Rushton et al., 2005). Chickens markets in urban areas have drastically changed, but demand for
chicken remains di￿erentiated based on breed as opposed to safety-related characteristics. Specially,
consumers in Ha Noi still prefer free-range chicken, and have largely not shifted to frozen chicken
cuts that are safety-branded and sold in supermarkets. For chicken purchased at home, about 90 to
95 percent is purchased from informal sources, largely wet or open air markets (I￿t et al., 2008a).
Chicken has an important cultural role in Vietnam, with most families eating chicken during the
New Year (Tet) and certain lunar holidays. Awareness of how di￿erent breeds of chicken are raised is
high amongst urban households, with consumers correctly linking breed and production environment
to desired meat quality characteristics(I￿t et al., 2008a). The vast majority of households overall
prefer to consume fresh food that is purchased daily in small markets near their home (Maruyama
and Trung, 2007). Very few studies, if any, to estimate chicken demand or demand for poultry
safety have been undertaken in Viet Nam, although avian in￿uenza outbreaks have led to increased
2interest in the development of the poultry sector in Vietnam. Of existing studies related to chicken
consumption, data collected has not been used for formal demand analysis (FiguiØ, 2007; Phan and
Reardon, 2007).
Demand for safety-branded free range chicken in urban areas of Viet Nam has a critical policy
importance. The production characteristics of free range chicken are di￿erent from those of con￿ned
(translated as ‘industrial’) chicken, both presenting unique food safety and animal disease risks.
Free range chicken is more likely to be exposed to wild birds, while industrial chicken production
present risks inherent to concentrated production (Otte et al., 2008). These types of chicken are also
produced on di￿erent types of farms and marketed through di￿erent supply chains (I￿t et al., 2008b),
necessitating di￿erentiated policies. Given the widespread popularity and large premium (up to
100%) for free range chicken, market-based policies are a promising mechanism to decrease epidemic
risk. The valuation that consumers place on safety-branding will determine the e￿ectiveness of
market-based policies such as third-party certi￿cation of poultry. If traceability and safe production
practices bene￿ts could be e￿ectively marketed, such characteristics move from being an additional
cost to providing tangible bene￿ts for producers, consumers, government, and society in general
(I￿t et al., 2008a). Traceability has bene￿ts of identi￿cation of the source of disease or low quality,
assigning liability, and allowing consumers to verify quality (Hobbs, 2004). This paper will focus on
identifying the valuation of safety-branding of free range poultry in Ha Noi, the capital of Viet Nam.
These measures can be used to determine the feasibility and potential welfare gains from credible
safety-branding and traceability.
Most food demand studies for developing countries utilize household surveys (such as LSMS surveys)
and use broad categories of food types, such as beef, poultry and pork (for example, Mdafri and
Brorsen (1993); Jabarin (2005)). Studies that focus on demand for speci￿c quality attributes, cre-
dence goods, safety, etc. are more likely to be undertaken in developed countries. Existing data on
consumption of di￿erentiated products is especially limited in developing countries, and this holds
in Viet Nam. Valuation of safety-branded free range chicken, or di￿erentiated chicken breeds in
general, requires original data.
Well-de￿ned stated preference methods can be important research tools, but are ultimately limited in
that they do not necessarily re￿ect actual behavior or preferences. List and Gallet (2001) estimated
that hypothetical valuation exercises lead to participants overstating their preferences by a factor of
33. Data collected from actual behavior or consumption choices is ideal, but often economists want
to measure preferences related to goods or services that are not actually sold. Price data can be
especially problematic, as it contains information about unobserved quality. Further, data on actual
consumption choices does not always allow economists to control for the context under which those
choices are made. In this respect, methodologies for undertaking ￿eld experiments are especially
useful in allowing for inference from otherwise limited data.
Economic experiments to value food safety and quality characteristics have been implemented in
several wealthier countries. Lusk et al. (2006)use an experimental auction to determine valuation of
genetically modi￿ed foods in the United States and Europe. Noussair, Robin, and Ru￿eux (2002)
use an experiment to determine if consumers value genetically modi￿ed organism food labels or lack
information. Lusk, Norwood, and Pruitt (2006) use coupon-based experiment to determine valuation
of antibiotic-free pork. Loureiro, McCluskey, and Mittelhammer (2003) use an economic experiment
to determine valuation of eco-label apples. Dickinson and Bailey (2002) use a laboratory experiment
to value several meat characteristics, including traceability. A few studies have successfully used
experiments to value food characteristics in developing countries ￿ Masters and Sanogo (2002) ￿nd
that the economic surplus from certi￿cation of nutrient density in infant foods in Malawi is over $1
million annually. For our ￿eld experiment design, we used aspects of previous experiments adopted
to the circumstances in Ha Noi poultry markets.
Field Experiment Design
Economic experiments o￿er a method for economists to observe actual choices made by households,
and to also control the conditions under which those choices are made(List, 2009). In this context,
an economic experiment was ideal for measuring consumer valuation of traceable free range chicken
that had a safety brand. We choose to implement an economic experiment that is closer to a ￿eld
experiment than lab experiment in design, which can be distinguished on several factors related to
the context in which individuals would actually make the decision being studied. Harrison and List
(2004) de￿ne several important areas of distinction, including subject pool and the commodity that
is involved. Our approach involves the actual subject pool and commodity that we are interested
in. Our participants further make a choice that has a non-hypothetical impact on their expenditure
4for the commodity of interest.
This ￿eld experiment was undertaken in conjunction a FAO-implemented pilot project for certi￿ed
supply chain for smallholder1 chicken in Hanoi (I￿t et al., 2009). Chicken from the project, henceforth
‘project chicken’, was sourced from small farms in a large rural district of Hanoi municipality. Two
major types of free range chickens are raised in Viet Nam, which are directly translated as ‘local
chicken’ and ‘crossbred chicken’. Local chicken is refers to native breeds raised on a scavenging diet,
while crossbred chicken are native and exotic crosses allow to scavenge in garden or con￿ned grazing
area with occasional purchased feed. All project chickens were crossbred chickens, as sourcing from
local chicken farms would have been too expensive given the dispersion and small number produced
at each farm.
Each project farm was required to have vaccination for HPAI and other common poultry diseases
and follow speci￿c guidelines for safe production practices. These farms were closely monitored by
local veterinary o￿cials, which were under the supervision of the district veterinary o￿ce. Farms
were also randomly visited by an external veterinary inspector as an additional safeguard. Within
a week of slaughter, a small but distinguishable tag was put on the foot of each chicken by local
veterinarians. The tag was designed so that if it was removed it could not be reused.
Through coordination with traders, the project chicken was delivered to registered 2 slaughterhouses
at a small wholesale market. The slaughterhouses then distributed the chicken to 8 vendors in 4
markets that were already a part of their distribution network. The vendors were supported with
training on chicken characteristics and advertising materials. The chicken was distinguishable to
consumers by the tag, and also was packaged after sale in a special bag. Vendors were responsible
for recording information on all chicken sales before, during and after the testing marketing period.
Through discussions with the market vendors, the ￿catchment area￿ for each market was de￿ned.
From this area, blocks were randomly selected and all households in those blocks were listed. Sys-
tematic sampling was used to select households within each market area, for a sample of households
that would be representative of all households that might regularly visit each market where project
chicken was being sold. Out of 1200 selected households, 923 households in total took the household
survey and participated in the experiment. All selected households were visited by enumerators to
1Free range chicken is largely produced by smallholders, who do not have su￿cient resources to produce industrial
chicken
2Very few slaughterhouses in northern Viet Nam achieve registration, or government certi￿cation
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The enumerators requested to interview the person with primary responsibility for food purchases
for each household visited.
After the survey, each survey respondent was o￿ered a choice of 1 of 2 discounts for 2 types of chicken
as a gift for taking the survey. Each set of 2 discounts was randomly assigned to each household,
with alternative 1 being project chicken and alternative 2 either regular crossbred or local chicken.
Whether the alternative was local or crossbred was also randomly assigned, and both alternatives
were to be purchased from the same vendor. After selection of a discount, the participant was given
a coupon that was redeemable from one of the project vendors. The household was told the weekly
market price of each type of chicken and was given a brochure explaining project chicken before they
make their choice. This would be similar to the market, where information was available on the
project chicken, but other chicken has no advertising or marketing.
Several di￿erent designs were considered for this experiment. The decision to conduct the experiment
through a household survey at the home instead of in the market was based on shopping habits.
Women conduct most of the food shopping in Ha Noi, and usually make daily trips to markets
purchase food. As several women work, the markets tend to be very crowded and busy for short
periods of the day. Outside of the busy periods, the number of customers is much less. Recruiting
survey participants in the market would have been di￿cult due to periodic crowding, and would
have also led to a much less representative sample. Enumerators visiting households could visit at
times which were convenient for the participants.
Auctions are a common method for experiments (for example, Lusk et al. (2006)), but the household
survey format of this experiment made such an approach too time-consuming. The household survey
format had the advantage of having detailed background information on chicken consumption, as
well as allowing for testing of the impact of household characteristics on demand for traceability. To
adjust for having only one choice set per participant, we increased the sample size to allow for more
decisions to be analyzed.
We also considered o￿ering participants the choice of a third option, such as cash or a general
discount on food. Due to safety and accountability issues, we choose not have enumerators carry
cash with them while implementing the survey. Having households make a series of choices is also
common in experiment or stated preference exercises (for example, Masters and Sanogo (2002)).
6This would involve giving the participant a choice between 2 discounts and having them select 1,
and repeating the exercise several times. The actual discount would be randomly drawn from the
selected discounts. Although such an approach allows for potentially greater inference, explaining
this procedure and conducting the series of choices would have taken a large amount of time to the
survey and experiment, likely decreasing participation.
The choice of presenting the coupon as a discount from total chicken purchase, a per kg discount,
or a low(er) price for a chicken purchase was based on the local circumstances. For the certi￿ed
supply chain project, the vendors were required to record all prices for all chicken sold, including
project chicken. Recording of individual prices and sales was unfamiliar for most vendors, so having
a discount coupon that was easy to use was very important. We also had to ensure that vendors
would have no incentive to misreport prices or quantities, as was the case with the options of a per
kg discount or a discounted total price. Due to bargaining, prices are always somewhat ￿exible in
Viet Nam, and vendors could not be persuaded to make a special case for customers with a discount
coupon. When presenting the choice to survey participants, they were told the discount for each
alternative, and the weekly market price for that type of chicken. Due to this uncertainty with
bargaining, we will use the customer’s choice of discount during the experiment to undertake our
analysis.
Branding and traceability could be considered di￿erent traits: branding has an a￿ect related to the
credibility or reputation of the ￿rm selling a product, while traceability is a speci￿c safety-related
characteristic. In this article we are analyzing valuation of both safety-branding and traceability. In
a laboratory experiment, it might be possible to distinguish between valuation of these 2 character-
istics, although safety-branding would always be unique to a speci￿c ￿rm. In practice traceability
cannot be separate from safety-branding, as traceability must be backed by credible source. The
information provided during the experiment and separately when test marketing the project chicken
provided a detailed description of the project activities and objectives. The organizations involved
had to listed on all materials, but emphasis (font size, content, etc.) was placed on the actual ac-
tivities and safeguards put into place. The actual traceability and safety guarantee was related to a
promise of safe production, trading and processing practices and the ability to trace chicken to the
original farm where the chicken were tagged. Although the tag was a unique innovation to ensure
traceability, consumers would still have to some trust in the sponsoring institutions and key project
7participants, which was achieved through the safety branding. We interchangeably use traceability
and safety-branding in this document, given their inherent inseparability in the market context.
Theoretical Framework
By conducting a ￿eld experiment, we are able to control the characteristics of goods that are o￿ered
to consumers, and have them make a decision that has a real impact on consumption. Lancaster
(1966)de￿nes goods as a set of characteristics, in which utility is a function of characteristics, not
goods. From this framework, utility from a good can be de￿ned as Ui = f(z); where z is a set of
characteristics of that good. Other than the chicken characteristics de￿ned in our experiment, which
were price, ‘project chicken’, and breed, no other di￿erences in characteristics could be discerned by
the participant.
The choice of alternative of each household can be represented by a random utility model. We can
assume that consumer’s utility is a function of observed characteristics and unobserved stochastic
variation across individuals. Observed characteristics ( z) are the price of chicken (p), safety of
chicken (t), and the variety (v) of chicken. Unobserved variation in utility is denoted as ", and can
be assumed to be distributed extreme value. Because variation in prices, safety, and variety were
randomly assigned, we know that error term or unobserved variation in utility is not correlated with
our observed characteristics, or E("izi) = 0 for observed characterstics. All variables are exogenous
by design, so our model with not be impacted by endogeneity problems persistent in market data.
In our experiment, we have chicken that is either traceable (project chicken) or non-traceable , as
well as chicken that is either crossbred variety or local variety. If utility is linear and additive,
it can be expressed as follows: Ui = 1pi + 2ti + 3vi + "i. Household characteristics (h) can
also be added our utility function by interactions with our variables of interest. We are most
interested in WTA traceability, so we will interact h with t for the following speci￿cation: Ui =
1pi + 2ti + 3vi + 4(tihi) + "i.
From this framework we can use a logit model to estimate the  coe￿cients and willingness to pay
for safety-branding and variety (Train, 2003). If a participant has 2 choices, she will pick option 1 if
1p1+2s1+3v1+"1 > 1p2+2s2+3v2+"2, or "1 "2 > 1p2+2s2+3v2 1p1 2s1 3v1. The
di￿erence in errors has a logistic distribution, which is a well-established property of these models.
8We then know that the probability of picking alternative 1 ; Pn1, is exp(zn1)
(exp(zn1)+exp(zn2)) , where 
is a vector of the  coe￿cients, and z is a vector of alternative characteristics.
Many of the disadvantages of a logit are related to independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and
issues with panel data. Given that we only had two alternatives and 1 choice situation, these concerns
are not relevant. Mixed logit would allow for estimation of taste variation across individuals, but
our data does not have enough alternatives or individual choice situations for a mixed logit. Logit
analysis hence is a reasonable approximation for average tastes (Train, 2003).
From logit estimation we can easily estimate willingness to accept (WTA), or equivalent variation
(EV), for speci￿c characteristics. We use the interpretation of WTA over willingness to pay (WTP)
because households were given a coupon, and the choice to give up one coupon over the other would
indicate willingness to accept certain characteristics over others. Equivalent variation is the amount
of utility that an individual would give keep a certain characteristic (or price). For logit models,
WTA (or WTP) can be directly estimated from our coe￿cients: WTA for characteristic i would be
i
p , where p is the price coe￿cient (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait, 2000).
Our price variable can be expressed as actual discount, price per kg less the discount, or price per
chicken less the discount. The most appropriate measure is the one that that best represents the
actual measure participants used to make their decision. If we use discount, the interpretation
of WTA will be willingness to accept a decrease in discount for a speci￿c characteristic, which
would be additional to any existing price di￿erential. The 3rd measure will have a straightforward
interpretation, while the second will not, as a whole chicken is usually heavier than 1 kg. This issue
will be further discussed in the results section.
Results and Conclusions
The choices that survey participants made based on discounts is summarized in table 1. In table
1, we can see that households selected project chicken 91% of the time when the alternative was
crossbred, and 65% of households selected project chicken when the alternative was local chicken
when the same discount was o￿ered for each alternative. Likewise, when the discount for project
chicken was 2,500 Vietnamese Dong (VND) larger than crossbred chicken, 96% of household selected
project chicken, while 85% of households selected project chicken when the alternative was local.
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Crossbred Alternative Local Alternative
Di￿erence in Discount Percent Obs. Percent Obs.
<-2,500 VND 57% 112 28% 98
-2,500 VND 70% 77 39% 66
Same Discount 91% 89 65% 83
2,500 VND 94% 84 71% 62
>2,500 VND 96% 129 85% 87
Total 82% 491 57% 396
Table 2: Conditional Logit Model Results








Local Breed 1.293 2.055 1.819
(.173) (.236) (.237)
Traceability 1.757 1.812 1.723
(.138) (.136) (.135)
Obs. 1774 1774 1774
Log-Likelihood -428.321 -492.77 -499.875
***signi￿cant at 1% level, **5% level, *10% level
2,500 VND is about $US 0.25. We can see that households responded to increasing levels of discount,
but that the local chicken alternative was considered more valuable that the crossbred alternative.
Results of our estimation using a conditional logit can be found in table 2. Although we do not
estimate the coe￿cients, we observe that all coe￿cients have a statistically signi￿cant e￿ect at the
1% level on the choice between alternatives. Traceability appears to have a consistent e￿ect across
speci￿cations, while local breed has more ￿uctuations. In table 3, WTA for both traceability and
local is calculated across di￿erent speci￿cations.
WTA traceability is much higher with e￿ective price or price per kg than with discount as the price
variable. This is true even when we add the existing price di￿erential to the WTA a discount for
traceability. Participants appear to have made their decisions largely by considering the discount,
instead of considering e￿ective prices, even though this information was given to them. Local chicken
is much more valuable than crossbred chicken, and the willingness to accept $0.37 as a lost discount
for local chicken indicates valuation of local chicken that is higher than the actual price di￿erential
10Table 3: Willingness to Accept Chicken Characteristics
WTA Traceability WTA Local Breed
Discount $US 0.51 $US 0.37
Unit Price Less Discount $US 2.67 $US 3.03
E￿ective Price $US 4.91 $US 3.94
with crossbred chicken. As long as prices do not re￿ect the full welfare gain from local chicken, a
higher WTA would be expected.
Using the price variable that best ￿ts true behavior is most appropriate in this case. We can see that
the discount had the greater weight in household’s decisions by disaggregating our sample between
households that were o￿ered crossbred as an alternative, and households that were o￿ered local
chicken as an alternative. When we analyze the subset of households o￿ered local chicken, we must
interpret the WTA the alternative as the WTA a discount for traceability over a discount for local
chicken.
The results of calculating WTA from logit estimation on these 2 subsets can be found in table 4.
When considering crossbred chicken, our WTA measure for traceability when we use discount is
almost the same as when we consider the entire sample. The WTA traceability for unit price less
discount and e￿ective price re￿ects the actual price di￿erential plus discount. For the subset faced
with the local chicken alternative, we see that WTA a discount for traceability over a discount for
a local breed is $0.14. When we calculate with unit price less discount as our price variable, our
coe￿cient for traceability is not statistically signi￿cant, hence we do not have an accurate measure
for WTA. For the e￿ective price, our price coe￿cient is only statistically signi￿cant at the 15% level,
so we must interpret this measure with caution. The WTA of $2.27 indicates households willing
to accept $2.27 for a project chicken purchase over a local chicken purchase, which is a little larger
than the existing price di￿erential between crossbred and local chicken. This type of measurement
of price gives unstable estimates of WTA traceability due to large price di￿erential between local
and crossbred chicken. In this case, mental accounting of the price di￿erential and discount might
have been more complicated than with just crossbred chicken.
Given that the coe￿cient on traceability is stable when we use discount as our price variable and
estimate with the entire sample or the subset that had crossbred chicken as an alternative, we will use
the measure of WTA a discount for traceability to determine valuation of traceable chicken. Given
that the price di￿erential for a whole bird (as observed in the market and reported to experiment
11Table 4: Disaggregated Willingness to Accept Traceability
WTA: Cross Alt. WTA: Local Alt.
Discount $US 0.47 $US 0.14
Unit Price Less Discount $1.06 $US 0.14 ?
E￿ective Price $US 1.29 $US 2.27 ??
?2 coe￿cient not statistically signi￿cantly below 0.15 level
??1 coe￿cient statistically signi￿cant above 0.15 level
Table 5: Impact of Household Characteristics
Description of Variable Mean Coe￿cient
Concern for chicken ￿avor (scale of 1-10) 7.2 -0.003
Concern for chicken origin (scale of 1-10) 7.4 -0.098*
Concern for avian ￿u (scale of 1-10) 8.3 0.064****
Previous purchase of private-branded chicken 0.58 -0.083
Weekly chicken consumption, kg 0.83 -0.174
Age of survey participant 47 -0.006
Participant is employed 0.63 -0.073
Participant recently exposed to HPAI information 0.67 0.103
Participant incorrectly answered basic HPAI questions 0.23 -0.176
Participant had previously heard of project chicken 0.07 -0.113
Participant regularly shops at project chicken market 0.55 0.227****
Concern for brand purchases (Scale of 1-10, summed for 5 products ) 29.57 -0.044***
Education level of household adults (1-5: 1=primary, 5=university) 3.3 0.310**
Enumerator appraisal of wealth level (Scale of 1-5) 2.8 0.036
Trust in Market Inspector (Scale of 1-10) 5.28 -0.193***
Weekly per capita food expenditure, $US 17.60 0.0004
***signi￿cant at 1% level, **5% level, *10% level, ****20% level
participants) between regular crossbred chicken and crossbred chicken with traceability is about
$0.50, we add that di￿erential to the WTA traceability, which indicates a valuation of traceability
of about $1 per chicken purchase. Even if our participants were placing more weight on the discount
when they made their choice, the stability of the WTA traceability across estimates indicates that
participants were aware of the existing price di￿erential.
In addition to measuring the valuation of traceability and safety branding, we are also interested in
the impact of household characteristics on preferences for traceability. We measure this by adding
various household characteristics to our utility function that are interacted with the traceability
indicator variable. These variables were individually added to the conditional logit speci￿cation the
discount as the price variable, with results in table 2. The results and a description of the tested
variables can be found in table a. The left column describes each variable, the middle column is the
mean of each variable, and the right column gives the coe￿cient ( 4) from the logit estimation.
12Our results for the impact of household characteristics on demand for traceability can be found
in table 5. The overall impact of household characteristics appears to be small, most variables
have an impact is of small magnitude, or is not statistically signi￿cant. Not all of the results are
intuitive, but might have several explanations. Concern for avian ￿u has a small positive impact,
while concern for origin has a negative sign. This might indicate that valuation of traceability is
relate to concerns other than a desire to know exactly what farm a chicken came from. Households
that regularly shopped at markets where project chicken were being sold appears to put a higher
value on traceability, but the e￿ect is very weak. One potential interpretation is that households are
more likely to trust brands or guarantees from vendors that they trust. Concern for brand purchases
has a negative and signi￿cant coe￿cient, but might just indicate that preference for brand purchases
in other areas is not related to chicken. Concern (or preference) for brand purchases was asked for 5
categories: cosmetics, appliances, liquor, clothes, and vegetables. Estimated individually, concern for
brand appliances has a signi￿cant and positive coe￿cient, but all other categories are not statistically
signi￿cant.
Households with a higher level of trust in their local market inspector were less likely to value trace-
ability, which implies that adequate trust in local institutions decreases demand for traceability or
safety-branding. Households were asked for their level of trust in varies entities, also including com-
panies, the Department of Animal Health, and their local market vendors. Local market inspectors
had the lowest score, while international companies and local market vendors were the most trusted
entities. The result that education increases valuation of traceability is also expected. Educated
households might have more knowledge of risks, or might have more interest in purchasing branded
items, as well as a larger income.
Through temporarily creating a supply chain for the chicken characteristics that we wanted to
value, we were able to conduct a ￿eld experiment that addresses many of the issues with valuing
food characteristics in developing country settings. We ￿nd that households living in urban Ha Noi
are willing to pay approximately $1 per free range chicken purchase for traceability that is backed by
safety branding. Through our household survey, we determined that average weekly consumption
of free range chicken is about 0.8 kg per week, and a free range chicken weighs about 1.2 kg. On an
annual basis, this indicates that each household would gain about $35 per year in welfare if current
free range chicken purchases were to have traceability and safety branding. This translates into an
13annual welfare increase of $66 million for the 1.9 million residents of the urban districts of Ha Noi.
Private or public measures to improve traceability and increase safety branding have a potential to
both increase consumer welfare, but also decrease public health risk.
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